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I. THE CENTURY THAT NEVER HAPPENED
Until quite recently, legal scholarship tended to consider the
nineteenth century a First Amendment wasteland. No landmark Supreme
Court decisions or major debates in the legal system alerted legal scholars
to the evolution of free expression ideas and practices in that otherwise
lively century.' This presumed century-long stasis should have appeared
curious: after all, the years between the demise of alien and sedition laws
and the era of the World Wars witnessed the radical democratization of
American politics, political debate, and the media coverage of both. That
period also witnessed revolutions, first in transportation and then in electric
communications, which together transformed the nation's information
environment and its press. The nineteenth century also produced the
greatest event of United States history-the Civil War-in which the
concepts of freedom and rights were central. That same century hosted the
American Industrial Revolution and processes of centralization and
national integration. These historical processes should have had a
significant bearing on the development of free-speech-related theory and
practice.
And indeed, recent historians of the First Amendment, taking their
cue from developments beyond the narrow confines of the legal system,
have been encountering a rich nineteenth century legacy of discourse on
freedom of the speech and press. Scholars including Michael Kent Curtis
(tracing free speech issues in the antebellum and Civil War eras) and David
M. Rabban (studying turn-of-the-century events) have been exploring
heretofore untraveled paths for understanding the transformation of First
Amendment sensibilities prior to the Supreme Court's great free speech
decisions in the twentieth century's interwar period.2 Yet with all of its
1. "Legal system" is used here in a broad sense, such as that suggested by Morton
Keller: "that densely woven fabric of lawyers and judges, cases and decisions" which
together form an "important part of the ... American polity." MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 343 (1977).
2. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000); DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997). Among the many recent works that address
free expression in the nineteenth century are: DONNA LEE DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF
TOLERANCE: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); MARK A.
GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM
(1991); JOHN LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1980); JEFFERY
A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE POWER (1999)
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richness, this new scholarship has failed to find antecedents for one of the
major issues on our contemporary free expression agenda: government
regulation of powerful, new technology-empowered communication
corporations that play a major role in shaping America's public sphere. As
Rabban has observed, "[S]ome current free speech issues were not
addressed before the [first world] war."3 A case in point was media
regulation. "Regulation of mass media and cyberspace," Rabban averred,
"were not topics of concern.., between the Civil War and World War I., ' 4
The present essay is intended to add a chapter to the emerging story of
freedom of expression in the nineteenth century. Its focus is precisely on
the missing link highlighted by Rabban: it discusses free press dilemmas
emerging from the diffusion of powerful media of public communications
in the post-Civil War generation. More specifically, it reconstructs a
prominent, generation-long debate over government regulation of the
telegraph ("the Victorian Internet") and the newswire services (America's
first national media enterprise) in the Gilded Age. This inexplicably
neglected chapter in the history of free speech is particularly compelling in
that issues that were rigorously negotiated during that time resonate in
present-day jurisprudence dilemmas regarding the nexus of
communications technology, government regulation, and free expression.
Such parallels between the nineteenth century debate and our contemporary
quandaries are not explicitly drawn out in what follows. They are, however,
quite patent, even striking. Moreover, and at least as important, the case of
telegraph and wire service regulation seems to provide a coherent link
between nineteenth century technological, business, and social
developments, and twentieth century First Amendment thought.
(providing an excellent discussion of free speech in parts of the nineteenth century, although
it focuses thematically on war); Timothy W. Gleason, 19th-Century Legal Practice and
Freedom of the Press: An Introduction to an Unfamiliar Terrain, 14 JOURNALISM HIST. 26
(1987) (providing an important insight on nineteenth century developments from the
perspectives of common law and legal scholarship); see also JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS
AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988). For
discussions of nineteenth century free expression developments in the historical tradition,
see infra note 5.
3. RABBAN, supra note 2, at 15.
4. Id.
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II. FREE SPEECH AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE AMERICA
In antebellum America, political and ideological controversies over
the fate of the Union subsumed the free speech debate.5 Free expression
was a significant aspect of the overall contest between slavery and
freedom, as illustrated by the Republicans' 1856 battle cry: "Free Speech,
Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, and Frdmont. ' ' 6 The
Union's victory, in a war construed by the North as a conflict about the
overall meaning of freedom, vindicated and enshrined an expansive theory
of civil liberties, freedom of expression included.7 Thus, during the Gilded
Age, it was no longer politics and ideology that launched and fueled the
free speech debate, but rather the state of the Union's economic, business,
and technological development. Concern over freedom of press and speech
in the postwar era emerged as an aspect of the nation's grappling with the
rise of corporate America and its search for a new industrial and business
5. Historical accounts of important antebellum and wartime free speech-related
developments include: CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD
SOUTH (1964); JOHN NERONE, VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PRESS: POLICING THE PUBLIC SPHERE
IN U.S. HISTORY 84-110 (1994); RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1963); LEONARD RICHARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF
PROPERTY AND STANDING": ANTI-ABOLITIONIST MOBS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1970);
Menahem Blondheim, "Public Sentiment is Everything": The Union's Public
Communications Strategy and the Bogus Proclamation of 1864, 89 J. AM. HIST. 869 (2002);
William E. Gienapp, The Crime Against Sumner: The Caning of Charles Sumner and the
Rise of the Republican Party, 25 CIVIL WAR HIST. 218 (1979); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The
Telegraph, Censorship, and Politics at the Outset of the Civil War, 40 CIVIL WAR HIST. 95
(1994).
6. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 302 (citing RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM
284 (1976) (footnote omitted)). For an alternative wording of the slogan ("Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men, Free Speech, and Frdmont"), see Gienapp, supra note 5, at 229.
7. This dynamic and its rationale are proposed and discussed in Menahem Blondheim,
Regulating Freedom of the Press (1997) (paper presented at the Fifth Conference on the
Nineteenth-Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression in America, available from
the author upon request). It is congruent with scholarship on the Civil War's more general
impact on civil liberties. Popular renderings of that process are WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); and GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT
GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992). These arguments should,
however, be supplemented with HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT
OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 65-80 (1973) (pointing out
the controversial and divisive nature of the war administration's record on civil liberties);
and MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1991) (exploring the actual performance of the Lincoln administration on civil liberty
issues).
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order in the aftermath of the late-century Industrial Revolution. In that
context, the particular focus of the freedom of speech debate was on the
role of government. More specifically, it centered on the powers of
government to regulate utilities that affected the circulation of information
and opinion.
8
The story of the emergence of industrial America and the appearance
of its big business organizations has been told from a variety of
perspectives. One of the most important, albeit neglected, is the
communication perspective. After all, the earliest and most formidable of
the new generation of businesses, corporations of unprecedented scale and
scope, were concentrated in the communication and transportation sector.
As concern over big business mounted in the decades after the Civil War, it
came to be focused on the problem of monopoly. And indeed, the first two
private-sector national monopolies in America were communication
concerns: the New York Associated Press and the Western Union
Telegraph Company. These two major players in the field of
communications foreshadowed the emergence of giant national
corporations in other sectors of the economy. Moreover, as business
historian Alfred Chandler has persuasively argued with reference to
Western Union, and as I have tried to demonstrate in the case of the
Associated Press, national communications concerns were instrumental,
perhaps even prerequisite, for the emergence of other clusters of industrial
and service corporations operating on a national scale and dominating their
respective fields of business.
9
8. For an exceptionally broad perspective on the rise of big business in the Gilded Age
see MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 162-96, 289-587 (1977). More recent works on the
rise of big business in its relation to government include: WILLIAM R. NESTER, A SHORT
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1998); HARLAND PRECHEL, BIG BUSINESS AND
THE STATE: HISTORICAL TRANSITIONS AND CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION, 1880s-1990s
(2000); and WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997). For a standard introduction to government regulation of
business corporations, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES
FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN (1984). Two
recent collections provide a broad perspective on problems of regulation: THE REGULATED
ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY (Claudia Goldin and Gary D.
Libecap eds., 1994); and THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ANTITRUST
RAILROAD REGULATION, 1870-1900 (Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994).
9. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 79-80, 188-205 (1977). See generally A NATION TRANSFORMED BY
INFORMATION: How INFORMATION HAS SHAPED THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES
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Thus, once government confronted the rise of big business and the
problem of private-sector monopoly, it would inevitably encounter the First
Amendment. But the bar, the prosecution, and the courts played no part in
the drama, and consequently, scholars who focused on the legal system in
tracing the development of First Amendment ideas-particularly when
using that system's records as their sources-followed suit and tended to
ignore these free expression quandaries. More surprisingly, perhaps, the
public debate over the regulation of communications during the Gilded Age
has evaded most students of American political economy, and of
communications history as well. In these realms, however, the oversight
was not due to a lack of sources: a massive corpus of primary materials
recording the debate, in print and in manuscript, is extant, and although not
always easily accessible, these materials are certainly compelling. ' 0
III. WESTERN UNION, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
AND THE LEGISLATURE
For more than a generation after the Civil War, government studied
the new realities of American communications as shaped by novel
technologies and microeconomic change. In the course of that generation,
the legislative and executive branches pondered their powers to control and
regulate the telegraph and news monopolies, which in turn profoundly
TO THE PRESENT (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & James W. Cortada, eds., 2000). For an
illuminating perspective on Chandler's approach, relevant to the fundamental observation
pointed out in the text, see Richard R. John, Elaborations, Revisions, Dissent: Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr.'s The Visible Hand after Twenty Years, 71 Bus. HIST. REV. 151 (1997). See
also DEBRA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS AND WEALTH
FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET (2001). On the AP's role in processes of national
integration and growth, see MENAHEM BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES: THE
TELEGRAPH AND THE FLOW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN AMERICA, 1844-1897 (1994)
[hereinafter BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES].
10. For an important exception to this failure of vision, see ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM: ON FREE SPEECH IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 75-100 (1983). Pool,
although expecting to find First Amendment implications in telegraph law and court
decisions, failed to uncover the relevant regulatory action. The broader implications of
regulation on media development are discussed, although not in detail, in DAN SCHILLER,
THEORIZING COMMUNICATION: A HISTORY (1996). See also Dan Schiller, Social Movement
in Telecommunications: Rethinking the Public Service History of U.S. Telecommunications,
1894-1919, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 397 (1998). For an example of the great potential of
tracing legislative debates affecting communication, see ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATI'LE FOR CONTROL OF U.S.
BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993) (studying radio regulation in its early phases).
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affected the American communications environment and the nation's press.
Indeed, the debate over telegraph and wire service regulation served as a
significant prelude and a useful rehearsal for realigning the powers of
government, judiciary, and corporate America, as well as the freedoms of
America's press and of its people.1
Western Union, established in 1851 as the New York and Mississippi
Valley Printing Telegraph Company, began buying out and merging small
Midwestern telegraph companies in the mid-1850s, the telegraph's "era of
consolidation."' 2 By the Civil War it represented the western leg of a
national telegraph duopoly, and after the war it managed to swallow up its
major eastern rival, the American Telegraph Company. Thus, by 1866,
Western Union could be considered what business historians call a "center
firm"-a corporation controlling more than ninety percent of its field of
business.13
Less conspicuous, but at least as dominant in shaping the national
communication and information environment, was the Associated Press
("AP"). By 1867, the AP was a coalition of regional press associations,
dominated by the New York Associated Press ("NYAP"). The NYAP,
founded in 1846, had managed, by shrewd maneuvering in both the
telegraph and newspaper sectors, to gain the questionable distinction of
being America's first private-sector national monopoly. From the mid-
1850s on, the AP and Western Union were very closely aligned. They fully
deserved their contemporary description as "a double-headed monopoly.' 4
11. The only detailed study of this regulatory debate is Lester G. Lindley, The
Constitution Faces Technology: The Relationship of the National Government to the
Telegraph, 1866-1884 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with Rice University).
See also Richard Du Boff, The Rise of Communication Regulation: The Telegraph Industry,
1844-1880, 34 J. COMM. 52 (1984).
12. This term and periodization is proposed in ROBERT LUTHER THOMPSON, WIRING A
CONTINENT: THE HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1832-1866
(1947), which remains the best and most authoritative narrative of the emergence of
Western Union.
13. Id. On "center firms," see, e.g., Thomas K. McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question,
in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 19 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981).
14. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 105 (1874). For background information concerning the
emergence of the AP, see VICTOR ROSEWATER, HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE NEWS-GATHERING
IN THE UNITED STATES (1930); RICHARD A. SCHWARZLOSE, THE NATION'S NEWSBROKERS:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS FROM PRETELEGRAPH TO 1865 (1989); BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE
WIRES, supra note 9; and Menahem Blondheim, The Click: Telegraphic Technology,
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While Western Union was a household name to most Americans, few
had ever heard of the AP, let alone realized its key role in the information
business. This was paradoxical. Only a small minority of Americans
actually used Western Union's facilities, but practically all literates in
America were daily consumers of AP's product: the telegraphic news
appearing daily in their morning and evening newspapers-the news that
really mattered. The AP, however, had a strong preference for working
backstage, leaving the limelight to its newspaper clients. When Congress
began to express its alarm over the rise of big business and to test the extent
of its own powers over private-sector monopolies, it was Western Union
that emerged as one of its foremost targets. The AP remained in the
shadows. 15
Business historian Thomas McCraw has suggested that to 19th
century Americans, "[c]enter firms seemed to be mutations, the
consequence of some sinister tampering with the natural order of things."' 6
Such firms seemed, moreover, "not merely economic entities but powerful
new political forces which must be opposed in the name of American
democracy." '7 And indeed, between 1866 and the close of the century, the
administration and the legislature incessantly, perhaps compulsively, tried
to find some way to keep Western Union in check. In the periodbetween
1866 and 1900, all Congresses but one considered plans to regulate
Western Union. 8 This intensive involvement yielded no less than ninety-
six bills and resolutions brought before Congress that addressed the
problem of Western Union. The various congressional committees that
took issue with the telegraph monopoly published forty-eight reports during
that period, some very extensive; other legislative reports and documents
remained in manuscript. The issue of telegraph regulation was very
prominent in the public sphere as well. It was debated extensively in the
Journalism, and the Transformations of the New York Associated Press, AM. JOURNALISM,
Fall 2000, at 27 [hereinafter Blondheim, The Click].
15. The relative invisibility of the wire service until the 1880s, when AP datelines
began to appear regularly, is illustrated by the fact that only seven references to the NYAP
appear in the New York Times index in the 1850s; but on each day that newspaper appeared
it carried NYAP telegraphic reports. BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES, supra note 9, at 6.
16. McCraw, supra note 13, at 19.
17. Id.
18. The one exception was the 44th Congress. During its tenure, however, the Atlantic
& Pacific Telegraph Company offered lively competition to Western Union. See MAURY
KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 197-205, 277-82 (1986).
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press and even constituted a favorite topic for college exercises in rhetoric
and debating.' 9
But with all of this preoccupation with the telegraph monopoly,
remedies remained elusive. Presidents, postmasters-general, congressional
committees, and individual legislators, in their endless procession of
addresses, annual reports, investigations, bills, and speeches, demonstrated
that they had no clear idea of what to do or how to do it. Most disturbingly,
neither could they seem to articulate a clear rationale for why something
needed doing. Notwithstanding their sustained efforts, legislators and
bureaucrats found it difficult to prove that Western Union's monopoly
harmed the common weal as prevailing economic theory postulated.2°
Lacking detailed information, experience, and an appropriate yardstick,
would-be regulators could not sustain the allegation that Western Union
was leveraging its monopoly position to charge unfair prices for its
services. Additionally, they could not demonstrate that the corporation
retarded technological development in order to buttress its monopoly. Even
the most populist voices that joined in the debate could not convincingly
point to a pattern of corrupt or even unfair business practices of the
corporation.2 1
Gradually, however, concerned legislators crystallized a general
premise for why it was not only right but also imperative to regulate
19. References to all these bills and reports, as well as to speeches in Congress on the
issue, are conveniently collected in Postal Telegraph Facilities, a pamphlet issued by the
Office of the Postmaster General, Sept. 25, 1890 [hereinafter POSTAL TELEGRAPH
FACILITIES].
20. The antebellum background is essential for understanding Gilded Age notions about
monopoly and government involvement in the issue. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 109-39 (1977).
21. One Congressman did go so far as asserting that the $370 million aggregate
personal wealth of the members of the Western Union board was derived largely from
speculation based on advance knowledge of commercial information. However, he
presented no proof that could substantiate the charges. Speech of Charles Sumner of
California in the House of Representatives, 25-27 (1884). Western Union, wary of foul play
concerning the flow of commercial quotations, called in Pinkerton Detectives to investigate
charges that its employees had used advance knowledge of quotations for speculation. The
suspicions were indeed confirmed, and the company acted vigorously in investigating them
and took severe action against the offenders. Letters from William Orton to Anson Stager
(Nov. 15, 1867); Orton to Alan Pinkerton (Nov. 19, 1867); Orton to M.H. Painter (Nov. 19,
1867); Orton to John Van Horn (Dec. 23, 1867), in WESTERN UNION PRESIDENTIAL LETI'ER
BOOKS (on file at the Smithsonian Institution); cf THE TELEGRAPHER (June 1 & 15, 1867;
Aug. 1, 1867).
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Western Union. This rationale focused less on microeconomic structure,
industrial dynamics, and business practices, and more on the fundamental
nature of Western Union's line of business. The telegraph company
handled knowledge, and its operations affected the minds of Americans.
Since it had the power to shape what the people knew, it was presumed to
wield power over what they thought. While general, abstract notions of
center firms as dangerous aberrations hardly provided a mandate for
legislative action, a monopoly of knowledge did.22 Western Union's
perceived power over knowledge was congruent with the notion of center
firms as sinister political forces, endangering the American way. Monopoly
control over information and opinion was precisely the kind of
concentration of power that statesmen would respond to in earnest, even if
it brought them to encounter sensitive issues touching on freedom of press
and speech.
IV. WESTERN UNION'S MONOPOLY OF KNOWLEDGE
Western Union's supposed power over the circulation of commercial
information and over political news emerged as a leading theme in
arguments for government regulation of the corporation. Pursuant to the
introduction of the first telegraph reform resolutions in 1866, a series of
bills proposing that the government purchase the corporation, that Congress
regulate its prices and business practices, or that the executive branch
establish competition to Western Union (the "Postal Telegraph"), were
characteristically justified by the crucial role the telegraph played in the
flow of commercial information and political news. Prominent features of
practically all the arguments made in Congress, whether for or against
22. The concept of monopoly of knowledge and its theory are identified with the work
of Canadian economic historian and communication theorist Harold Adams Innis. While the
notion is applied frequently in Innis's two major communication works, THE BIAS OF
COMMUNICATION (1951) and EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS (1950), it is most clearly
developed in THE PRESS: A NEGLECTED FACTOR IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1949). There are numerous interpretations and applications of Innis's
concept of monopoly of knowledge. A standard interpretation is James W. Carey, Canadian
Communication Theory: Extensions and Interpretations of Harold Innis, in STUDIES IN
CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS 38-45 (Gertrude Joch Robinson & Donald F. Theal eds.,
1975). A more recent interpretation may be found in Menahem Blondheim, Harold Adams
Innis and His Bias of Communication, in CANONIC TEXTS IN MEDIA RESEARCH (Elihu Katz
et al. eds., 2003). A popular modem work focusing on the issue of media monopoly is BEN
H. BAGDAKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1987).
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government involvement in the telegraph industry, were Western Union's
services of commercial quotation distribution, representing its power over
the nation's business, and the company's system of news distribution,
representing the corporation's potential political influence.23
Before long, these two issues were differentiated. While Western
Union's control over general and business news were both understood as a
source of great power, the implications of centralized control were
recognized to be different for either kind of information. Dissenter
Benjamin Butler could be counted on to growl against both, but early on he
focused on Western Union's control of commercial information. The
telegraph company, he complained, was "a controlling agency of
commerce." "There is no industry," he added, "no interchange of
commodity, no value, that is not at its mercy."'24 To Butler, it followed that
the telegraph monopoly was "burdensome, oppressive, and dangerous to
the public welfare." 25 In defense, Western Union argued, with much merit,
that by centralizing and nationalizing market information, it equalized
opportunity rather than fostered privilege.26 From as early as 1866-67,
Western Union operated a Commercial News Department ("CND") that
processed and distributed key market quotations to boards of trade and
other commercial associations, as well as to individual business houses
throughout the country several times during business hours. But this
function of the telegraph giant, however intimidating, seemed to have a
progressive effect. The CND leveled information advantages across the
country and put all the nation's traders on the same footing, equalizing
opportunity in the process.2
7
Beyond commercial markets, in the trade of political news, monopoly
also affected centralization and uniformity. Thus, monopoly was thought to
affect the marketplace of ideas, stifling public debate and bringing about a
monolithic public sphere. Western Union's vast system sustained the
distribution of uniform AP telegraphic news reports to the press of the
23. See Postal Telegraph Facilities, supra note 19.
24. H. R. REP. No. 43-125, at 5-6 (1st Sess. 1875).
25. Id. at 7.
26. See S. REP. No. 43-242, at 81-82 (1874).
27. A short description of the CND and an analysis of its significance is provided in
Menahem Blondheim, When Bad Things Happen to Good Technologies: Three Phases in
the Diffusion and Perception of American Telegraphy, in TECHNOLOGY, PESSIMISM AND
POSTMODERNISM 77-92 (Yaron Ezrahi et al. eds., 1994).
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entire country. The implications of uniformity and centralized control in
this type of information were vastly different from those of standardization
in commercial information. Rather than benevolent, these effects could be,
and were, recognized as dangerous. Having a single dominant source for
political and social information could at best stifle, at worst eliminate,
public debate and meaningful public opinion. As Gardiner G. Hubbard, the
foremost lobbyist for the Postal Telegraph, argued, influence over the
nation's telegraphic news report represented "a power greater than any ever
wielded by the French Directory, because, in an era when public opinion is
omnipotent, it can give, withhold, or color the information which shapes
that opinion. It may impart an irresistible power to the caprice of an
individual."28  Western Union thus represented the specter of an
uncontrolled private-sector economic interest wielding political and
ideological power on a national scale by affecting the minds of Americans.
And indeed, as it evolved, the debate over regulation of Western
Union became increasingly focused on the relationship between the
telegraph monopoly and the press. As early as 1866, protagonists of
telegraph regulation pointed to Western Union's potential influence over
the press as sufficient justification for a postal telegraph. By 1870, the
Select Committee on the Postal Telegraph reported that the wire services,
"and consequently the newspapers, are completely in the power of the
telegraph companies." 29 Two years later, a Senate committee that
recommended government support for competition in telegraphy pointed
out that the power "of influencing public opinion and action in any
important crisis, is possessed by those who control the telegraph."3 An
unscrupulous person who controlled the wires would become the "master
of the press," and could "give to the news of the day such a color as he
chose, and thus fatally pollute the very fountain of public opinion." 3
28. S. REP. NO.48-577, pt.l, at 17 (1884).
29. H.R. REP. No. 41-114, at 46 (2d Sess. 1870).
30. S. REP. No. 42-242, at 4 ( 3d Sess.1872).
31. Id. at 5 (citation omitted). That same year, a committee recommending "to connect
the telegraph with the postal service" pointed out:
The relations of the telegraph to the press and to the Government have reached a
degree of importance overshadowing considerations heretofore considered. In this
country the perpetuation of the Government must have its ultimate guarantee in
the intelligence of the people. No agency is so potent in the dissemination of
intelligence as the press, and to the daily press the telegraph is far more essential
that the post.
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The public and the press, however, appeared surprisingly oblivious to
that ecological danger. The Postal Committee that studied bills in 1869
proposing to regulate the telegraph industry noted that if "the people
desired to make the change that desire would naturally show itself in the
form of petitions to Congress, or in the resolutions of State Legislatures."32
"[B]ut," acknowledged the committee, "no such petitions or legislative
resolutions have been received from any quarter." 33 Western Union took up
this argument with glee. It repeatedly explained that "there is no public
demand" for measures of telegraph regulation, and moreover, that "the
press does not support" them.34 Celebrated economist David A. Wells
appended to his widely circulated 1873 study, The Relation of the
Government to the Telegraph (sponsored by Western Union), hundreds of
newspaper clippings that proved the press's overwhelming opposition to
government involvement in telegraphy.35
But Western Union's argument proved to be a double-edged sword.
To the extent that the national newswire service set the agenda for the
press, and that the press set the public agenda, indifference to the danger of
Western Union's monopoly was hardly an oversight. The Western
Associated Press ("WAP") was bound by its contract with Western Union,
and other press associations by their best interests, not to support any other
telegraph company. This clause in the WAP contract was intended to be
broadly construed. It even extended to a dictum not to "speak in
H.R. REP. No. 42-6, at 7 (3d Sess. 1872). The committee report argued that since Congress
had the power to regulate the mails, it had similar constitutional authority to regulate the
telegraph. It stated that in order to secure freedom of the press it was necessary to exercise
that authority. Id. Another committee, reporting in 1875, elaborated on the clause in the
contract between Western Union and the WAP that forbade the press to encourage telegraph
competition, to demonstrate "how complete, controlling, burdensome, oppressive, and
dangerous to the public welfare, the telegraphic monopoly has thus become." H.R. REP. No.
43-125, at 7 (1st Sess. 1875).
32. H.R. REP. No. 40-32, at 12 (3d Sess. 1869); cf S. Misc. Doc. No. 42-86, at 2 (2d
Sess. 1872).
33. H.R. REP. No. 40-32, at 12. My survey of petitions to Congress on this issue indeed
yielded relatively few examples. See, e.g., Memorial Recently Adopted by the Chamber of
Commerce of Portland, Oregon, Favoring the Early Connection of the Post-Office
Department with the Telegraphic and Telephone Businesses of the United States, 52nd
Cong. (1892) (on file at the National Archives, RG 46. Sen. 52 A-J20.1).
34. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 108 (1874).
35. DAVID A. WELLS, THE RELATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE TELEGRAPH (1873).
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disparaging terms of the Western Union Telegraph Company. 36 Before
long, congressional investigators uncovered that clause in the contract
between Western Union and the WAP. "[Tihe Western Union has bound
the Associated Press ... to oppose any other telegraph company," reported
a congressional committee.37 "Then," the committee noted, Western Union
"point[s] to the columns of the papers as evidence that neither the journals
themselves nor the public desire a change. 38
Here was the specter of a restraining influence on the press, fully
realized. But in no way did it resemble what the founders had dreaded. It
was not the government making laws to abridge press freedom for its own
interests; it was rather a powerful monopolistic corporation wielding a
dominant technology and making business arrangements that restricted
freedom of the press. Congress was seeking legitimacy to overcome
Constitutional hurdles in exercising its legislative power over private-sector
corporations, so as to "free the press."39 Government was thus searching for
ways and means to regulate the circulation of information, and more
generally, to shape the communication environment, but in the interest of
freedom of the press, not its restraint.
Congress, although it debated the case of Western Union's monopoly
of knowledge in session after session, made no headway in solving the
problem of monopoly in news through wielding legislative or executive
action. Yet by merely staging the debates, Congress affected the newswire
business significantly. As early as 1866, Western Union conceived a plan
to venture into the news vending business on its own account. It allied itself
with the WAP-at the time a discontented client of the NYAP-and also
with NYAP's retiring general agent, Daniel H. Craig. With their help, it
36. H.R. REP. No. 41-114, at 103 (2d Sess. 1870). Western Union's contract with the
WAP is quoted in CIRCULAR FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITrEE OF THE WESTERN
ASSOCIATED PRESS, CONTRACT WITH THE NEW YORK ASSOCIATED PRESS, AND WESTERN
UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY 7-8 (1867) (private circular not for publication) (available in
the William Henry Smith papers, on file at the Indiana Historical Society). Murat Halstead
noted in that circular that the clause "which forbids us to encourage or support any
opposition or competing telegraph Company;... was to the Telegraph Company a valuable
consideration for the favorable terms upon which they contracted with us." Id. at 2.
Halstead's statement was later quoted in numerous government documents concerning
Western Union.
37. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 3.
38. Id.
39. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 9.
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laid the groundwork for establishing its own news service that would
supplant the AP as the national provider of telegraphic news. But as soon
as Western Union learned that Congress was scheduled to take up Senator
W. Gratz Brown's widely supported telegraph reform resolution of
December 1866 and his bill of January 1867, it abandoned the venture. In
1882, Jay Gould, who then controlled Western Union, retreated from a
similar scheme concocted together with the WAP. Once again, it was a
House initiative in support of two postal telegraph bills-which were
ultimately presented to Congress early in 1883- that made Gould abandon
his ambitious plan. 4°
Between these two episodes, the press associations, realizing that
Western Union was concerned about government action to counteract its
supposed power over the press, took full advantage of Western Union's
vulnerability by negotiating better terms for their news services. 4 1 The AP
coalition skillfully leveraged the government's involvement to exert
pressure on Western Union and managed to shift the balance of power
between the two heads of the nation's "double-headed" telegraphic news
monopoly. Thus, in explaining his strategy toward Western Union in 1873,
the general agent of the WAP wrote an executive committee member: "Can
the Telegraph Co. afford to offend the Western Associated Press? It is very
well known," he answered his own rhetorical question, that Western Union
"is very anxious to preserve a good understanding with us, especially while
there is possibility of legislation in Congress." 42
It would therefore appear that by the mere threat of wielding
regulatory powers, Congress managed to strike a blow for press freedom
and against capitalist control. Better yet, Congress did not even have to put
the extent of its power to regulate freedom of speech to the Constitutional
test-it had succeeded in defending the press by merely threatening to
40. BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES, supra note 9, at 143-51, 164-66.
41. See Letters from William Orton to Anson Stager (November 11 & 29, 1869), in
WESTERN UNION PRESIDENTIAL LETrER BOOKS (on file at the Smithsonian Institution);
Letter from W. Scott Smith to William Henry Smith (July 16, 1869) (William Henry Smith
papers, on file at the Indiana Historical Society); Letter from W. H. Smith to Whitelaw Reid
(February 17, 1877) (Whitelaw Reid papers, Library of Congress); Letters from W. H.
Smith to Richard Smith, (Jan. 7, 1882, June 12, 1882) (William Henry Smith papers, on file
at the Indiana Historical Society).
42. Letter from Smith to Haldeman (May 10, 1873) (William Henry Smith papers,
Ohio).
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make laws that would prevent the abridgment of the latter's freedom. But,
as legislators shortly discovered, their de facto diminution of Western
Union's powers in the news industry was hardly a victory for freedom of
the press in America. Legislators would discover this through a gradual but
significant shift in the focus of their investigative activities.
V. ZEROING IN ON THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
In round after round of congressional investigations, Western Union
defended itself from government criticism by pointing to the part played by
its ally, the Associated Press, in disseminating the nation's commercial
information and general news. As Congress was uncovering Western
Union's control over commercial quotations in 1874, its president, William
Orton, not only pointed to the public good affected by the service, he also
magnanimously declined sole credit for accomplishing it. Orton pointed out
that "the agents of the ... Associated Press" gathered the news supplied by
Western Union's Commercial News Department.43 The news, he added,
"comes over the cable and Western Union lines in cipher, and we don't
know any more what is in them than the mail-carrier knows what is in a
sealed letter."' In other words, Western Union merely played the role of
carrier and distributor. It was the NYAP that gathered and edited the
commercial news. Western Union would present the same argument in
recurring debates over its monopoly in the supply of general and political
news.
And indeed, as information about monopoly of knowledge in America
accumulated, the crux of the debate in Congress gradually shifted from the
role of Western Union in telegraphic transmission to the control the AP
exerted over the flow of national news, over the press of the country, and
supposedly, over the opinions of Americans.45 What Congress found was
43. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 81 (1847).
44. Id. at 81-82 (1847). The most elaborate description of the working relationship
between Western Union and the AP was provided by Orton in his testimony before the
Committee on the Judiciary, on Feb. 21-22, 1875. Investigation of the Western Union
Telegraph Company, 43rd Cong. (I 875)(manuscript on file at National Archives, HR 43A-
F14.5, RG 233) [hereinafter Western Union Hearing].
45. It was noted above that only a few petitions or public resolutions were presented to
Congress in the interest of controlling Western Union. There was, however, a petition to
Congress, submitted by the National Typographical Union in 1869, that called for regulation
of the AP. It complained that because the AP restricted its reports, it was "lessening the
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alarming. It discovered that the members of the NYAP-seven powerful
dailies in New York City-practically controlled the national supply of
news. It learned that the news-that was gathered daily from all over the
country and the world-was "edited," or "censored" (a term legislators
were more comfortable with) in one office by one man.46 Congress also
discovered that the product of that "censorship"-a single dispatch-was
then radiated throughout the country to AP members and clients,
representing a vast majority of the nation's important newspapers. Worse
still, it discovered that there was no close alternative to the AP's service; it
was in effect the exclusive "fountain-head" of the confluence of America's
news.47 Then Congress uncovered perhaps the most troubling feature of the
system: the privilege of receiving AP reports was restricted. Certain
newspapers could access them, others could not. Newspapers that were not
so privileged had only a small chance for survival.48 Congress also found
that Associated Press newspapers were not allowed to receive telegraphic
reports from any competing news service, thus effectively the AP ruled
itself a monopoly. To top it all off, Congress revealed that freedom of the
press did not apply to criticism of the management of the wire service.
Newspapers receiving the wire service's news were forbidden to criticize
the Associated Press publicly, on pain of losing their franchise. The AP
was the one institution in America that was immune from scrutiny by the
press.4 9
But the main lesson the legislators learned concerned the
technological and business rationale for the emergence of center-firms, and
the elimination of small, peripheral firms. A national telegraph network and
demand for our labor." The resolution termed the Associated Press "one of the worst
monopolies in existence." S. Misc. Doc. No. 41-13, at I (2d Sess, 1869).
46. See, e.g., infra, text accompanying note 47; GARDINER G. HUBBARD, THE
TELEGRAPH AND THE PRESS: THE TELEGRAPHIC PRESS REPORTS AND THEIR COLLECTION,
DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION [ 1874].
47. S. REP. No. 43-242, at 108.
48. In most cases, local pools of newspapers determined whether a newcomer would
get the news. When they opened their ranks, it was usually in consideration of a weighty
bonus. BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES, supra note 9, at 160-61. By 1879 an AP
franchise in Chicago was worth more than $100,000, and in New York more than $500,000.
49. The most elaborate investigation of this point was perhaps in James W. Simonton's
testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 25, 1875. Western Union Hearing,
supra note 44; cf THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. WHY IT INVITES PRIVATE COMPLAINT AND
OBJECTS TO PUBLIC ASSAULT (n.d.).
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a national news service made news "broadcast" possible.5° It was simply
600 times cheaper for 600 newspapers to share a single AP news dispatch,
receiving it simultaneously via a single transmission over a national
Western Union circuit, than for 600 newspapers to procure 600 individual
news reports and receive them via 600 separate point-to-point
transmissions. According to economists, telegraphic broadcast technology
had thus made news reports a "public good," even if liberal statesmen
seriously doubted how good they really were for the public.5 '
Finally, the AP bylaw, which forbade member .newspapers from
receiving additional telegraphic news reports from any alternative source,
made it impossible for a would-be competitor to enjoy similar economies
of scale and scope. Under the operation of the bylaw, no competitor could
establish itself and serve the struggling outside press. Consequently, the
newspaper market would remain closed, dominated by AP member-
newspapers and franchise holders. Not surprisingly, therefore, by the late
1870s the justifications for regulatory action had been transformed.
Regulation was no longer intended to rescue the press from the clutches of
a telegraph monopoly; it was now aimed to free the people from the abuses
of a press monopoly. Thus, in discussing the necessity of telegraph
regulation in 1879, the chairman of the Committee on Railroads averred
that "what has done more to agitate this question and to call ... for some
legislation" was the "very great monopoly upon the part of the Associated
Press. '52 By 1884, telegraph regulation was freely presented as an attempt
to promote competition to the AP. The Postal Committee believed that "[i]t
is only the fact of a monopolized news distribution which makes a news
censorship possible," such "as now exists in the case of the Associated
50. See generally Blondheim, The Click, supra note 14 (discussing the "broadcast"
mode of telegraphy).
51. In our contemporary terminology, the advantages of the Associated Press were in
the maximization of productive and allocative efficiency and in economies of scale. For a
general description of the nature and theory of the public good, see PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1970), and Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971). For its
relation to telegraphy, see Erik D. Craft, Private Weather Organizations and the Founding
of the United States Weather Bureau, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 1063 (1999); and Erik D. Craft, The
Value of Weather Information Services for Nineteenth-Century Great Lakes Shipping, 88
AM. EcON. REV. 1059 (1998).
52. S. REP. No. 45-805, at 4 (3d Sess. 1879).
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Press."53 The committee submitted a postal telegraph bill and promised that
"under the operation of this bill several associations shall be formed to
collect and distribute the news."54 Since the Postal Committee held that
"the telegraphic news is the breath of life to the daily press," it considered
its reform bill "a proclamation of emancipation" for the press. 5
With the AP replacing Western Union in the hot seat of Congressional
investigations of news control, the balance of power between the two
organizations was once again altered. Western Union discovered that its
affiliation with the wire service was no longer an asset in combating
government regulation; it was becoming instead a very dangerous liability.
In 1882, when the NYAP applied to the telegraph company for better
terms, Western Union President Norvin Green, rather than conceding,
lectured the president of the AP. Some of the association's practices, wrote
Green to David M. Stone, "devolved upon this company, as its assumed
ally, more odium and antagonism in legislative bodies, the popular mind,
and the outside press, than any one thing in the history of this company." 56
But Congress also came to realize that its existing legislative
machinery was not necessarily capable of combating the news monopoly
and emancipating the nation's press. "This discrimination is inequitable
and unjust," stated one committee in reference to the AP's practice of
restricting the privilege of membership and preventing new newspapers
from receiving its news reports, "but it is not contrary to any existing
law. 57 After all, the AP was a voluntary arrangement, and it received no
particular sanctions or privileges: it was merely a successful player in a free
marketplace of news, sustained by the logic of an advanced networking
technology. There appeared to be only one solution that would allow full
freedom of the press in the age of wire news, and the uninhibited Benjamin
Butler could be counted on to propose it most bluntly. He suggested that by
regulating the price of telegraphic news messages, government could
minimize the economies of scale that the AP enjoyed. "Government shall
fix the rates" of news transmission, proposed Butler, and "by that means all
53. S. REP. No. 48-577, pt. 1, at 17 (1884).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Letter from Norvin Green to David M. Stone (Jan. 5, 1882), in WESTERN UNION
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER BOOKS (on file at the Smithsonian Institution).
57. S. REP. NO. 43-624, at 3 (1875).
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questions of the Associated Press or other associations can be regulated by
the government, by whom they should be regulated." 58
VI. THE REGULATOR, THE AP, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The AP responded to the charges of its dangerous concentration of
power, and to the threat of regulation that would curtail it, with two
arguments and one tactic. The tactic was elementary enough: the AP
simply did not report the debates on its affairs and the allegations made
against it to the press and public. By this tactic, it ironically confirmed the
most severe accusations made in the statements it repressed. As its
opponents correctly argued, the AP controlled the confluence of speedy
news flow and thus had the power to set the press's agenda and affect
public debate. The association went right ahead and exercised its gate-
keeping powers in reporting the debate over its own regulation.
This gate-keeping tactic was best demonstrated in the case of
Nathaniel P. Hill's 1884 attack on the AP in the Postal Committee he
chaired. In committee, Hill interrogated the AP's general agent, William
Henry Smith, on the extensive coverage the AP gave Western Union's
arguments in favor of the status quo, in contrast to its suppression of
arguments in favor of reform. Smith found it easy enough to explain the
wide circulation of Western Union's statements in the press. The telegraph
company, Smith informed the committee, frequently telegraphed press
releases and its own official pronouncements in its controversy with
Congress to every newspaper in the country via the AP, free of charge.
"Does [the Associated Press] ever send anything that is injurious to the
Western Union Telegraph Company?" asked Senator Hill. "It has done so
repeatedly and constantly for years," replied Smith. "It is very difficult for
those who read the newspapers to discover it," offered the Colorado
Senator in response.59 Smith, in turn, discovered that it was very difficult to
explain the meager exposure legislative reformers received in AP reports.
Hill questioned Smith as to why the AP's report of the elaborate and
scathing speech he recently delivered in the Senate against the telegraph-
news monopoly amounted to: "Senator Hill spoke on the postal telegraph
bill." Smith answered, "That was probably recondensed somewhere."
58. S. REP. No. 45-805, at 32 (3d Sess. 1879).
59. S. REP. No. 48-577, pt. 2, at 303 (1884).
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"Very much," Hill dryly responded.60  And indeed, AP internal
correspondence proves Hill's point quite convincingly. When the Senator
submitted the report of the committee he chaired, the Washington agent of
the AP was aghast. "I can hardly believe," the agent wrote Smith, "that
anybody except ... Mr. Hill, who fathered it, would be willing to endorse
such nonsense . . . .But it is given to us ... as the work of the
'Committee."' 6 The agent, of course, had no intention of sending
"nonsense" to the American public. Accordingly, he informed Smith that "I
make no use of [the committee's report] except to send you [a] copy." 62
Another AP staff member in Washington telegraphed Smith that "Hill's
report on postal telegraph contains many untrue statements concerning
ass[ociate]d press which I cut out. He is either brainless or an intentional
falsifier. ' 63 The wire service kept the opinions of its Congressional
opponents, as well as its opinion of them, off the public record.
The AP's two arguments against the initiatives to break up its
monopoly through regulation were at least as audacious as its tactics in
reporting them. As an introduction to these arguments, AP management
arrogantly informed Congress that it didn't stand a chance of breaking the
association's power through tampering with telegraph rates. Then it went
ahead to insist that Congress had no constitutional right to try and do so.
Management also pointed to two important distinctions between its
association and the railroads, or for that matter, the telegraph industry. The
AP's managers and spokesmen maintained that it was a private partnership,
not a chartered or incorporated body, and it was therefore beyond the reach
of legislatures. Its second argument was that any legislative action that
would affect the AP and its monopoly would constitute infringement on
freedom of the press.64
60. Id. at 305.
61. Letter from David R. McKee to William Henry Smith (May 22, 1884) (William
Henry Smith papers, on file at the Indiana Historical Society) [hereinafter McKee to Smith
Letter]; cf the very revealing correspondence between the two on the issue of Hill and his
report, included in the undated Henry William Smith correspondence in the Delavan Smith
papers, available at the Indiana Historical Society.
62. McKee to Smith Letter, supra note 61.
63. Unsigned telegram, (May 22, 1884) (William Henry Smith papers, on file at the
Indiana Historical Society).
64. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 48-577; pt. 2, at 287-303; S. REP. No. 45-805, at 38-51, 62-68
(3d Sess. 1879).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Accordingly, the AP informed the public that by considering
regulatory measures to affect it, "Senators are seriously considering the
propriety of regulating the press through Congressional enactments. '"65 It
added, sarcastically, that by doing so
[a]n improvement is to be attempted upon the Virginia Bill of Rights,
the Ordinance of 1787 and the Constitution. Without doubt the average
legislative mind conceives it possible to do that, and make regulation
consistent with the First Amendment, which says Congress "shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."66
The association then topped off its constitutional argument against
regulation by providing a broad frame, from a political-culture perspective,
for interpreting the legislature's hyperactivity in its affairs. According to
the AP, governmental involvement could not possibly have been triggered
by the worried response of legislators and executives to the Industrial
Revolution-to the rise of big business, industrial monopoly, and more
generally, to the consolidation and nationalizing of American society.
Rather, the association's representatives averred, the opposite was the case:
"political theories, the logical result of which is socialism,"67 emboldened
government in its quest for centralized power, and gave rise to
governmental regulatory action. The consequent "tendency to look to
government for everything" encouraged "the demogogue [in Congress] to
seek power under the shallow pretence of subserving the public welfare."6
The AP concluded this appeal to conservative sensibilities and to
sentimental notions of laissez faire, by returning to its theme of sinister
governmental encroachment: "Will the politicians' dream of Governmental
regulation of the press ever be realized? 69
The AP's position was replete with irony. On one hand, it considered
itself too private to be interfered with by government, but on the other hand
it argued that its role in the newspaper industry affected such great and
sacred public rights, that even government could not touch them. Seven
65. Preface to Government Regulation of the Press: Testimony Taken Before the Senate





69. Id. at 2; see also Letter from McKee to Smith (June 10, 1884) (William Henry
Smith papers, on file at the Indiana Historical Society) (commending the strategic skill of
the argument in "turning the guns of the enemy upon themselves.")
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New York editors (comprising the NYAP) could decide, as they in fact did,
that "there should be fewer newspapers . .. . We think there are too many
newspapers." 70 They claimed the right to determine for the people "how
many papers ought to be published in a certain place," and to "take away
from lawyers who have failed at the bar, and preachers who have retired
from the ministry, and politicians who have been repudiated by the people,
the inspiration to become journalists." 71 They could also enforce these
theories in the newspaper industry, and in practice did so repeatedly. It was
academic that Congress and the administration might take exception. Those
who had framed the Bill of Rights long before the advent of the telegraph
did not deem Congress responsible enough to intervene in such questions.
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, in perhaps the most
thorough congressional debate on the regulation of the AP-that of 1884-
took issue with the association's two main contentions. He recognized that
the AP was not an incorporated body, yet he did not think it could be
treated as a private one. Wilson offered:
It seems to me that it is possible for the Associated Press to mislead the
public with regard to public affairs and with regard to business ....
They supply that to the press of the country, from which the great mass
of the people derive their information, and on which they act in their
business affairs and in public affairs. Now, it seems to me that an
association or an individual engaged in that kind of business stands in a
very different relation from the man who is conducting a store, a
grocery establishment, a manufactory ....
[B]ecause of the close connection between that association ... and
the public affairs of the country, it stands upon a different basis from
that of the ordinary business of the people. 72
Wilson's notion of the public nature of the AP's business ultimately
extended into a regulatory rationale. He thought it was "one of the
governmental possibilities that a business occupying such a position might
be touched by the power of regulation," notwithstanding its being a private
partnership.73 Wilson also assaulted the AP's defense based on the First
Amendment, asserting that regulation not only could be done but also
should be done. Conceding that "Congress cannot abridge the freedom of
70. S. REP. No. 45-805, at 69 (3d Sess. 1879).
71. S. REP. No. 48-577, pt. 2, at 293, 314 (1884).
72. Id. at 298-99.
73. Id. at 299.
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the press," Wilson countered the argument by proposing that in the present
case, "regulation enacted by Congress ... would make more effective the
freedom of the press."74 The conflict between the AP position and that of
the Postal Committee was epitomized in a short, sharp exchange between
the AP's William Henry Smith and Henry Wilson: "The Constitution
guarantees the liberty of the press, and regulation is inconsistent with the
liberty of the press," announced Smith. "It is not inconsistent," retorted
Wilson, "to pass a law for the freedom of the press and the enforcement of
that principle of the Constitution."75
VII. EXIT CONGRESS, ENTER THE JUDICIARY
At this stage of the debate, in the mid-1880s, the issue of busting the
Associated Press monopoly gradually faded away from the public agenda.
Mainly for fear of government intervention, the Western Union, the NYAP,
and the WAP encouraged the establishment of a competing newswire
service, the United Press ("UP"). Then, the veteran powers in the news
business entered into a secret trust agreement with the UP, the putative
competitor they had nurtured.76 According to the secret agreement, the AP
clandestinely supplied the UP with a version of the news it had gathered-
at considerable expense-thus lifting the barrier to entry into the wire news
business. In return, the AP received a major share of UP's windfall profits
from selling a product that cost practically nothing to procure. After 1884,
once the UP became securely established, the notorious AP bylaw that
forbade clients from receiving alternative news reports no longer affected a
total restriction of trade. With a second commercial provider of telegraphic
news securely established, new newspapers could be founded. There were
no more complaints from would-be editors who could not get telegraphic
news, and there was nominal competition between wire services.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES, supra note 9, at 167. For the emergence of the
United Press as an adjunct to Western Union and the Associated Press alliance, see the
extensive correspondence between Jay Gould, Thomas T. Eckert, Norvin Green, W.H.
Smith, Richard Smith, and Whitelaw Reid, throughout 1882, in WESTERN UNION
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER BOOKS (on file at the Smithsonian Institution); the William Henry
Smith papers; and in the Whitelaw Reid papers, Library of Congress. The major features of
the arrangement appear in E. D. Morgan and Jay Gould to David M. Stone (June 2, 1882),
and W.H. Smith to Jay Gould (June 10, 1882) (William Henry Smith papers, on file at the
Indiana Historical Society).
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Legislators slept easier, and the veteran press associations received from
their junior competitor and secret partner bountiful financial bonuses year
after year.77
But the real issue was only disguised, not eliminated, and before long
it surfaced once again. In 1891, the AP's secret trust agreement with the UP
was publicly revealed. The revelation wrought havoc in the AP
organizational framework.7 ' A protracted war between AP factions ensued
and was resolved only by a thorough reorganization of the nation's wire
service.7 9 In 1893 a new organization, formally entitled "AP," was
chartered in Illinois.8" Rather than a coalition of regional partnerships and
cooperatives, the new AP was a coherent entity, which ultimately exercised
a national monopoly. The government made no response. It had learned the
lesson of a generation of unsuccessful attempts to regulate the news
business in the name of freedom of the press. Legislators and government
officials realized that the founding fathers had made it practically
impossible to make any law in the premises. 81
It was the judiciary that came to the rescue. The Supreme Court of
Illinois took upon itself to address the principles involved in regulating the
Associated Press. In 1900, the court, reversing a decision in a suit brought
by the Chicago Inter-Ocean against the AP, fashioned the unique status of
this private-sector company operating in the most public of businesses. 2
The court reasoned that the news gathered by the Associated Press was
of vast importance to the public, so that public interest is attached to
the dissemination of that news .... It has devoted its property to a
public use, and has, in effect, granted to the public such an interest in
its use that it must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good.83
That, of course, was the rationale sounded time and again by Henry Wilson
and other legislators in their attempts to regulate the AP-attempts that
failed partially due to First Amendment scruples.
77. BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES, supra note 9, at 166-68.
78. Id. at 168.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. SCHWARZLOSE, supra note 14, at 131-181; BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES,
supra note 9, at 166-68.
82. Inter-Ocean Publ'g. Co. v. Associated Press, 56 N.E. 822 (I11. 1900).
83. Id. at 825.
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The court then entered the realm of microeconomics and addressed
the veteran AP bylaw that required clients to take its reports exclusively. s4
Throughout the congressional debates, the implications of this bylaw in
buttressing the AP's monopoly were repeatedly highlighted. The court
merely paraphrased a long series of legislative addresses, resolutions, and
committee reports in finding that the bylaw tended "to restrict competition
because it prevents [API members from purchasing news from any other
source than from itself.""5 By this means the AP created a monopoly of
knowledge that, as legislators had repeatedly pointed out over the past
generation, prevented robust public debate, negating the rationale of free
speech. Given its monopoly position, argued the court, the AP had the
powers to
designate the character of the news that should be published, and,
whether true or false, there could be no check on it by publishing news
from other sources. [Associated Press] would be powerful in the
creation of a monopoly in its favor, and could dictate the character of
news it would furnish, and could prejudice the interests of the public.86
The court thus added nothing to the legislators' analysis of the bylaw
and its consequences. Acknowledging that bylaws "must always be strictly
subordinate to the constitution and the general law of the land," and not
"infringe the policy of the state, nor be hostile to public welfare," the court
simply struck down the bylaw. Its "tendency .. . to create a monopoly in its
own favor" made it "illegal and void. 87
The Illinois court's reasoning was thus identical with the rationale
that congressional reformers had arrived at through a generation-long
debate over the news-telegraph monopoly. Congress, however, could
neither turn its notions into law nor implement them, due to constitutional
limitations on Congress vis-A-vis the press. In other words, it was not really
the Supreme Court of Illinois that interpreted and applied the First
84. Id. at 826.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. By the time of the Inter-Ocean suit, the Associated Press was incorporated in
Illinois. See SCHWARZLOSE, supra note 14, at 198-204; Frederick S. Siebert, International
Protection of Rights in News, 9 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 290 (1932); Frederick S. Siebert,
Rights in News, JOURNALISM BULL., Nov. 1927, at 45; William F. Swindler, The AP Anti-
Trust Case in Historical Perspective, 23 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 40 (1946). See also
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN AMERICA 203-12 (1991) (discussing subsequent antitrust litigation against AP).
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Amendment for an industrial, nationalizing America. Rather, it was a
generation of representatives and senators, corporate executives and public
activists, journalists and newspaper readers, who reflected on the First
Amendment implications of technological change, industrialization, and
national integration. They debated the issue in Congress, board meetings,
the press, college exercises in rhetoric, and probably in cafds, salons, and
saloons, too. After a generation of action, reaction, and reflection, the
impact of the nineteenth century's industrial revolution and
communications revolution on the meaning of freedom of speech and press
had been crystallized. The Supreme Court of Illinois merely voiced public
opinion and what had become the common sensibility. Its decision was
essentially thrashed out in the public sphere-the bright light of American
enterprise, politics, and legislation. It cannot be properly understood by
merely traveling the blind alley of First Amendment legal sources.
VII. EXIT THE HISTORIAN, ENTER THE LEGAL SCHOLAR
The Founding Fathers had considered the press a crucial component
of America's public sphere. As such, they defended it from a powerful
potential rival: the federal government. By the end of the Civil War,
government and press reached a modus vivendi in sharing the public
sphere, and there emerged a wide consensus in considering a free and
responsive press to be a crucial factor of American public life. The threats
to freedom of press in the post-Civil War period came not from
government but from private-sector corporations affecting the nation's
public discourse. But government, held suspect by the word of the First
Amendment, could not muster the legitimacy to regulate private-sector
corporations impacting on the nation's press. The judiciary, however, was
free from such restraints; it could step in and fill the void.
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court decision was merely a prelude to a
series of resounding freedom of expression decisions handed down in the
era of the World Wars.88 The judiciary had marched into the First
88. For summaries of these decisions, see, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); and RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 20.1-20.19 (3d ed. 1999). For
historical context and background, see, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1961); and RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE
ABRAHAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987). For a critical survey of
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Amendment void, and began applying the rationale of nineteenth century
statesmen, soldiers, and reformers in setting rules shaping and reshaping
America's communications environment, its public sphere, and the
freedom of its press. In doing so, the court was expounding the
accumulated wisdom bred of civil liberties activism in the Jacksonian era,
of antebellum opposition of slavery and the slave power, of Civil War non-
conformism, the framing of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and of Gilded Age legislative reform. By the time of the post-World War I
great free-speech decisions, these nineteenth century ideas had crystallized
into truths that came to be held as self-evident. The Court merely rendered
them in legalese. In applying these now commonplace ideas, the court's
rhetoric was so convincing, it sounded as if it was expounding the intent of
the founders and framers. Perhaps even the Court itself was deceived by its
own rhetoric, and confused what they found in their own hearts and minds
with what the founding fathers said and did. Before long the Court's
rhetoric, reflecting either self-deception or a manipulative quest for
legitimacy, was taken at face value. Conventional legal wisdom began to
read history backwards and hold that Brandeis and Black, Holmes and
Frankfurter, were indeed sounding the voice of the framers, rather than
their own contemporary sensibilities-sensibilities that had been nurtured
in the nineteenth century. 89
Leonard Levy, in his Legacy of Suppression, as well as subsequent
free speech revisionists, uncovered this anachronism, but they generally
failed to trace its origins and pave an alternative development path.
Focusing on the legal system and its most conspicuous records and sources,
they found little that could sustain a responsible reconstruction of the
transformation of free speech ideas in the course of the nineteenth
century. 9° As recent students of the First Amendment would suggest, and as
the opinions of Holmes and the interwar court, see WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976).
89. For a seminal and remarkably dominant work in this vein, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,
JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1954). Of its 566 pages, a grand total of four pages
are dedicated to the nineteenth century. For the origins of Chafee's views, see ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in
Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919). For a history of Chafee's work and legacy, see
RABBAN, supra note 2, and David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,
90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
90. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); and LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
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illustrated in the foregoing, that course may be traced by taking a closer
look at nineteenth century library and archive shelves, in particular those
with political, economic, and communication history call numbers. For as it
appears, an examination of nineteenth century communications, ideology,
political economy, and social process may help provide a proper
understanding of subsequent, and even our contemporary, perspectives on
freedom of speech and press.
(1985). Levy finds that in the late eighteenth century, notions of press freedom were
negatively construed as freedom from prior restraint, in contrast to the early twentieth
century, in which press freedom was understood as a robust positive right. Representative
examples of revisionist scholarship include EMERSON, supra note 88; JOSEPH J. HEMMER,
JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); and WILLIAM W. VAN
ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984).
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